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Dickson: Strategic Effect

Harry Crerar and an Army
for Strategic Effect
Paul Dickson

F

ew people did as much to shape Canada’s
Second World War effort, and no single
person did as much to shape the Canadian army,
as did General H.D.G. “Harry” Crerar. As chief
of the general staff during the critical year and a
half following the fall of France in June 1940, he
was the primary architect of First Canadian Army,
established the conditions for the army’s training
and expansion, and advised the government
to dispatch troops to Hong Kong. As a corps
commander, he campaigned for Canadian
involvement in the Dieppe raid. And, by 1944, he
had assumed command of the army, eventually
leading a combined Commonwealth army – the
largest ever commanded by a Canadian – during
the Rhineland offensive. His views on the form
Canada’s military contribution should take
became policy, even though many opposed them,
including Prime Minister Mackenzie King.
Crerar’s achievements (and failures) are
explainable, in part, by the nature of the crisis
facing Canada and the Commonwealth during
the Second World War. Nazi Germany was on the
verge of victory in the summer of 1940 and the
logic of that situation seemed to dictate, at least
in hindsight, that Canada, united in the face of
this clear threat to national survival, indeed to
western civilization, commit itself to an all-out
war effort. From that starting point, Canada’s
military effort – a full field army (First Canadian
Army) and at war’s end, the third largest navy
and the fourth largest air force – seemed logical.
But there was nothing predetermined about
Canada’s war effort. In the words of a recent
critical review of a book on the “fateful choices”
made that summer, “more than most periods in
history, the summer of 1940 was pregnant with
a veritable brood of…plausible futures.”1

That was true for Canada as well. But
Crerar’s ability to shape that future was also a
product of the ambiguity that the fall of France
introduced into a civil-military balance that
traditionally marginalized the military. Combined
with the strategic vacuum left by the new
constitutional relationship with Great Britain,
the summer of 1940 saw what might have been
the first true debate about how Canada should
exercise its independence in pursuit of national
interests. If the country’s primary strategic goal
was to ensure the defeat of Germany, the most
immediate priority was to stave off the defeat of
Great Britain. Mackenzie King, however, recalling
the severe political divisions of the First World
War, believed that his goal was to bring Canada
through the war intact. Crerar, among others,
pursued different goals – he believed that Canada
must emerge from the war with a more robust
military and a recognition that responsibility for
national defence was shared between politicians
and the military. And, he believed, the country
needed a greater appreciation of the costs of
sovereignty. He saw himself as a steward of the
Canadian army, and this too shaped his goals. He
met resistance, not least from Mackenzie King,
and this shaped his methods. And the nature
of the war itself shaped the results. In the end,
he was a general who acted as if he wielded an
instrument of national power in the national
interest, before these concepts had been given
concrete form by a country and government that
had no machinery to develop or articulate them.
He conceived a field army that could achieve
what in today’s parlance would be strategic effect,
a military that is relevant. That is a military
force that can make a strategic contribution to
the defeat of the enemy, as well maintains its
capabilities and continue to fulfil national roles,
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including increasing Canada’s international
influence and capacity to shape the international
environment. The results took the form of First
Canadian Army, as well as a significant naval and
air effort, but that effort came at a cost. Canada’s
role in 1940 was not clear. Crerar played an
important, indeed critical, part in defining the
country’s war effort. The issues he grappled with
– how does Canada engage the world? what are
its interests? and how could it best exercise its
interest on the international stage? – were as
complex and as difficult then as they are today.
Crerar was, like all of us, a child of his
particular time. From Crerar’s perspective,
the predominant theme during his life was
the emergence and evolution of a Canadian
nationalism that distanced itself from its British
origins. That this theme was one of the crucial
subtexts in Crerar’s life was no surprise given
both his family background and his chosen
profession. During the late 19th and early 20th
centuries Canada was evolving and a nascent
Canadian national identity was maturing, or
at least emerging. Crerar was engaged in some
of the turning points of that growth. For the
better part of his life, Crerar, like many of his
contemporaries, saw no conflict in being British
and Canadian. Today, we tend to understand
the relationship as evolving sequentially from
one to the other, but it was rarely that neat. In
the 1930s, he described himself as a “British
subject, and a Canadian national” – these were
not incompatible. Linda Colley suggested, in her
study of the emergence of a British identity, that
identities are not like hats; you can wear more
than one.2
Crerar’s life was shaped by Canada’s
constitutional and political development. Born
in Hamilton, Ontario in 1888, he was raised by
fiercely imperialist parents, educated at Upper
Canada College and the Royal Military College,
went to war in 1914 and joined the permanent
force in 1919.3 Queen Victoria was on the throne
when he was born. As Crerar grew up under
Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier,
the country had no navy, no constitutional role
in foreign policy, and the United States was
considered a major threat. It had no air force;
flight was in its infancy. Crerar was 11 when
the Boer War broke out; he was 22 when MPs
became salaried; and he went overseas in 1914
at the age of 26. He was 32 when the universal

franchise was introduced and 43 when the
Statute of Westminster was enacted. He was 58
when Canadian Citizenship Act became law and
the current Canadian flag was adopted the year
of his death in 1965.
Crerar certainly represented a particular
constituency in Canada, but the clarity and
assurance he brought to bear on events following
1940 was the result of personal encounters with
the history of the period. The First World War
and the interwar period – and it was when it
became the “interwar” period that its influence
was most keenly felt – were formative ones for
Crerar. His ideas on the military were planted
before his wrenching experiences during the
First World War, but the trauma of that conflict
cemented in his mind the belief that a strong, or
at least professional, military was necessary to
protect Canada’s interests and promote Canadian
sovereignty.
His desire to promote defence preparations
was also intensely personal. The First World
War was a family trauma for the Crerars. His
younger brother Malcolm was killed, another
severely wounded, and the stress and losses
undoubtedly contributed to his mother’s death
in 1919. Crerar himself was nearly killed at the
Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915 and lost
many friends over the next three years. The war’s
impact was evident in his diary entry from June
1915, as he pondered the deaths of friends and
his experiences of the past two months:
The pity of this killing business gets me
sometimes. War is so very truly hell and this yard
by yard fighting finds it at its worst. The gains
are so small when it comes to distance – it just
resolves itself into a case of counting corpses, if
we have fewer than they, it’s a “victory.” There is
no romance in such as that. We’ll beat them some
day but they’ll never be able to pay their just debt,
the swine, not in this world anyway.4

Even at the end of the Second World War, Crerar
refused to meet with his counterparts on the
German side to take their surrender, sending his
corps commanders, Lieutenant-Generals Charles
Foulkes and Guy Simonds – “I saw no purpose in
meeting any German generals unless I had to on
some official capacity,” he recalled, “…I have had
them in adjoining fields…that was enough.”5
The First World War was personally traumatic
for Crerar, but it became futile only in retrospect
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as a new war loomed. The
memory of formidable
reputation Canada’s
army had gained and the
loss of professionalism
in the 1920s and 30s,
as well as the personal
costs shaped his agenda,
from his appointment
as chief of the general
staff to army command.
Crerar was authentic in
his pursuit of a mature
national defence policy
process and military
professionalism. He
may have be calculating
in his pursuit of his
objectives, but he was
also principled. He
was ambitious, but
it was harnessed to a
purpose.
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the growing autonomy
from Britain. However,
this trend seemed to
develop with little sense
of what autonomy and
sovereignty meant. From
a defence perspective,
there was nothing to fill
the vacuum that would
be left if the relationship
to the British was
completely abandoned.
These concerns were
evident in a speech given
in 1926 to the Royal
United Service Institute
and later published
in Canadian Defence
Quarterly:
The great war terminated
with the military forces
of the Empire a unified
fighting organization…
[Despite the current
divisions, public
sentiment would insist
that Canada fight with
the UK] when war again
threatens, however, our
responsibility as soldiers
stands clear – against
that day to prepare
the military machinery
of the Empire for its
highest effectiveness.6

Crerar joined the
permanent force soon
after the war ended. He
had a slow but steady rise
as a staff officer. Postings
to Ottawa and the UK,
particularly time at the
Staff College, Camberley
and the Imperial Defence
College, marked him as
an officer on the rise. The
Crerar had been
promise of the immediate
overseas for several
postwar period, when
years at that point, but
Crerar could boast
his pronouncements
of the newfound
Lieutenant-Colonel H.D.G. Crerar, photographed
caught the attention of
in London during the First World War.
professionalism of the
O.D. Skelton, under
Canadian permanent
secretary
of
state
for
External
Affairs, in Ottawa,
force, however, gave way to disillusionment in the
who
described
them
as
“out
and out advocacy
late 1920s and frustration by the 1930s. As the
7
of
Imperialist
[sic]
policy
in
defence.”
General
international environment grew more ominous,
staff
officers’
talks
were
carefully
monitored
for
the military’s influence remained marginal,
any
discussions
of
policy,
an
approach
which
leading Crerar to characterize this period as the
prompted most senior officers to err on the
“stagnant backwaters of the interwar army.”
side of caution. A year later, General Andrew
McNaughton cancelled a proposed talk on
Crerar was as proud of the record of Canadian
“Canadian defence problems.”8
Corps as he was distraught at the cost of obtaining
it. And as he watched its professionalism
As Canada’s constitutional position changed
dissipated, his frustration grew. For Crerar,
during
the 1920s and 1930s, Crerar’s nationalism
this process paralleled, and was fuelled by,
39
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also took a different form. He was more politically
aware and more pragmatic. He reconsidered
the military’s relationship to a maturing nation
and concluded that the proof of that maturity
was its willingness to defend itself. He saw
Canada’s defence preparations in the context of
a more mature partnership. He still remained
committed to the Commonwealth, but believed
that national sovereignty was more than a
declaration in a document. It was the result of
public engagement and the implementation of
serious policies. If Canada was now a partner
with Great Britain, then at the very least it had to
take its responsibilities seriously. Local defence
was the least it could do. It was not clear that the
government shared this view. To be fair, neither
did much of the public. During his tenure as the
Director Military Operations & Intelligence from
1935 to 1938, he worked hard to promote his
ideas, convinced that the logic of his ideas would
bear fruit if enough people were exposed to them.
However, the results were minimal.
Germany’s invasion of Poland brought
some clarity to the issue, but not as much as
the nostalgic glow which memories of that war
suggest. Canada’s role was not immediately clear.
Prime Minister Mackenzie King intended that
Canada’s effort, and liability, would be strictly
40
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limited. He pressed hard to ensure
that Canada’s contribution would
be industrial and agricultural;
militarily, he focused on the
air force as the cheapest and
most cost-effective contribution
Canada could make, at least in
terms of lives. In the spring of
1940, Mackenzie King argued to
a Cabinet War Committee torn
over whether to create a twodivision corps that even this was
excessive: “We could have used
our money more effectively if it
had all been confined to air and
naval services.” He conceded
that the “national spirit, however,
demanded an expeditionary
force; would demand it having full
national expression. I stressed
the necessity of maintaining the
pride and the morale of the little
force we have by making them a complete entity.”
J.L. Ralston, then minister of finance, agreed.9
The fall of France in June 1940 lifted some
of the constraints on Canada’s war effort, but
King did not immediately expand the military.
Memories of First World War casualty lists and
divisive debates over conscription were foremost
in his mind. At the height of the crisis, on 5 June,
Mackenzie King spoke to the Liberal caucus on
the “necessity of keeping Canada united and our
war effort being based on that: of balancing all
matters, going just as far as we could, and not
so far as to create a worse situation than the
one we were trying to remedy.”10 It is not clear
if Mackenzie King truly believed that a united
Canada was worth the cost of a defeated Britain
and a Nazi-dominated Europe, but, if he meant
it in a narrow sense, there was some logic to his
view that broken armed forces could be rebuilt
faster than the country. In either case, in his
mind, the limits of Canada’s war effort were
prescribed by this goal.

Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Photograph Collection

Canadian War Museum (CWM) 19920263-058

Major-General Crerar shakes hands
with Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie
King.

Crerar had no doubts that Canada’s army
contribution had to be significant and that
Canada should share the costs and risks with
the British. He saw a large army as a critical
contribution to the defeat of Germany, and a
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logical step after the effort in the First World
War, one that might prevent a “return to the
stagnant backwaters” of the interwar period.
Crerar believed that Germany would only be
defeated when its army was defeated. It is also
clear that he saw Canada’s contribution in terms
of a British Commonwealth coalition, dictated
by both sentiment and the logic that Canada’s
military was organized, equipped and trained
along British lines. He believed that Canada’s
effort must be shaped by its own interests. And
Crerar knew the effects he sought.
This was evident from the first days of the
war. When Crerar was sent to Great Britain in
1939 to establish what became Canadian Military
Headquarters (CMHQ), he lobbied hard for the
infrastructure for a larger effort than the one
or two divisions envisioned by the Canadian
government, and to establish principles for
Canadian autonomy.11 He was embarrassed by the
parsimony of the government, not least because he
recognized the contradictory impulses of seeking
autonomy while insisting that someone else foot
the bill. In the spring of 1940, for example, before
a corps was formed, he and Lester Pearson, first
secretary at the Canadian High Commission in

Britain, warned of the poor impression being left
by the government’s insistence that the British
pay for non-divisional support troops.12 The best
example of how he saw the exercise of autonomy
occurred as the French armies were collapsing
following the evacuation at Dunkirk. In June
1940, as the British considered returning to
the continent to shore up the collapsing French
armies, Crerar advised them, “In my view, and
I believe the view of the Canadian Government,
the Canadian forces now available over here
should be regarded as available to accept the
same responsibilities, however dangerous, as
those which it was proposed to allot to similar
British formations.”13 The Canadian government
was less confident, but Crerar forged ahead. And
by the summer of 1940, he was in a position to
pursue his aspirations.
Appointed chief of the general staff in July
1940, Crerar took an expansive view of his
responsibilities. He saw himself as a steward
of the army’s professionalism and as the
government’s chief military advisor, a combination
that informed his approach to army expansion.
Crerar genuinely believed a large ground force
was necessary to defeat Germany. He was

Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Photograph Collection

Prime Minister King reviews an honour guard from the Royal 22e Régiment
during a visit to their training camp in Surrey, England, 26 August 1941.
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J.L. Ralston, minister of national
defence, visits the troops in England.

equally committed to ensuring that when the war
ended, the armed forces did not return to their
previous state. “We must not lose a moment,” he
emphasized in a memorandum for the minister
of national defence written as Crerar returned
from the UK, ”in undertaking a thorough analysis
of Canada’s post-war military requirements and
in planning a defence organization which will
produce our future service needs with a maximum
of efficiency and a minimum of expense.” A truer
expression of his feelings was excised from the
first draft of the memo: “Even should victory be
gained it is as certain as anything can be that…the
armed forces of Canada…will not be allowed to
slip back into the stagnant backwaters of their
pre-war existence.”

He established conditions for
expansion, enlarged the training
infrastructure and the period
of training from one month
to four; cultivated media and
political support; and enhanced
his position relative to other
chiefs and branch heads to
ensure he was the chief military
advisor. Most important, in
successful struggles for army
expansion in fiscal years 19401, and 1941-2, he convinced a
reluctant J.L. Ralston, minister
of national defence, and many
on the Cabinet War Committee,
first that a large field army effort
was necessary and then that it
was feasible without resort to
conscription. This was no mean
feat, and the other services
copied his approach, with similar
successes. Concerned over the general staff ’s
continual call for more men, an exasperated
Ralston admitted to Grant Dexter in 1941, “[I
am] minister but must act upon the advice of [my]
staff of professional soldiers. Being a civilian, [I
cannot] set aside [my] advisors simply because
[I] disagreed with what they said. They knew; [I]
did not know.”14 Ralston’s comment captured

Over the next year and a half Crerar
set about trying to make that goal a reality.
McNaughton’s by-election loss in February 1945 was
viewed by many as a rebuke of King’s war policies
and his handling of conscription. McNaughton was
“mystiﬁed” at his loss, but he was pilloried by many
editorial writers, including those from the Globe (the
cartoon accompanied the editorial), for what they
characterized as his failure to support his army. Despite
what seemed like a vote of conﬁdence for Crerar’s
view of the role of the military in rendering professional
advice to their political masters, as suggested by the
cartoon, his inﬂuence was on the wane. Note: the Crerar
identiﬁed in the cartoon is T.A. Crerar, not Harry Crerar.
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Queen Elizabeth ﬂanked by Generals Andrew McNaughton and Harry Crerar.

perhaps the most significant change that had
occurred in the summer of 1940 – the military
were viewed as the principal advisors to the
minister, sharing responsibility for defence policy.
Soon the army, as well as the navy and air force,
expanded to unprecedented sizes. First Canadian
Army, Canada’s first field army, became a reality
in 1942. Crerar had by then been appointed
general officer commanding (GOC) 2nd Canadian
Infantry Division, and, after some debate, as
Acting GOC 1st Canadian Corps.
Crerar’s goals and influence also manifested
themselves in the pursuit of operational experience
for the Canadian army. The relationship between
his pursuit of the expansion of the army, the
dispatch of troops to Hong King and participation
of Canadian troops in the Dieppe raid is not
often remarked upon, but they were tied
together in Crerar’s mind not just as necessary
for maintaining morale, and public interest in
the army, but also for their effect on Canada’s
status as a partner with the British and their

potential impact on the postwar status of the
military. By late 1940, Crerar was concerned
about the army’s inexperience and during 1941
and 1942 contrasted its relative inactivity with
the sustained combat of the First World War
Canadian Corps and the heavy fighting by other
Commonwealth armies during the early years of
the Second World War. Here he was out in front
of the government. In December 1940, when in
the UK to seek British opinions of the expansion
of the army, Crerar pressed Sir John Dill, chief
of the imperial general staff, on whether there
was any desire to use Canadians in Libya. When
Dill indicated that the British preferred that the
Canadian formations remained in the UK, Crerar
stressed that he “knew of no desire on the part of
the Canadian government to discourage the use of
its forces ‘in any operations in which they could
usefully play a part, no matter where the theatre
might be.”15 Mackenzie King was less certain,
opposing any such commitment, reasoning that
Canada had no interests in the “Empire War” and
that “we owed it to our men to seek to protect
43
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Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar explains the plan for Operation “Totalize” to war correspondants
assembled at First Canadian Army Headquarters, Amblie, France, 7 August 1944.

Crerar’s perspective was also evident in his
support for the decision to send Canadian troops
to Hong Kong as part of the Anglo-American
attempt to deter the Japanese from entering the
war. When asked in September 1941 whether
Canada could spare troops to reinforce the
garrison at Hong Kong, Crerar warned of the
attendant military risks, and suggested that no
commitment should hinder the preparations
and build-up of Canadian forces in the UK. Still,
he believed that if the British had already made
the decision to reinforce the garrison, then the
question of whether Canadian troops should
be sent was ultimately a political and moral

decision.17 There were other influences, of course.
He believed that that the army needed action
during crucial period of expansion, and his own
study of the Pacific situation and Hong Kong’s
position convinced him that Japanese would
choose the rational course since they could not
beat the British Commonwealth and the United
States, an opinion shared by many Japanese
leaders. But Crerar believed it was ultimately a
moral and strategic question, and he framed it in
coalition terms, echoing his comments of June
1940: if the British (and the United States) had
decided it was worth the risk to reinforce their
forces in the Pacific, how could Canada say no?

CWM 20070029-005

their lives.” Further he suggested, somewhat
oddly, that fighting in the interests of the empire
might even “engender annexationist sentiment in
Canada.”16

When overseas in 1942, as the acting GOC,
1st Canadian Corps, the same concerns and
logic informed his ongoing support of raids and
then the Dieppe operation, even as it outgrew

44
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the concept of the small, limited coastal raids
in which he had hoped his troops could obtain
some experience. He believed Canadian morale,
domestically and in the army, was hurt by the
knowledge that Canadian troops trained and
waited while others fought. He saw small raids,
like First World War trench raids, as providing
experience and action, enhancing morale.18 And
so much the better if it stimulated domestic
support for army in Canada, and maintained
voluntary enlistment, something made even more
important, ironically, by the potentially negative
impact of the Royal Commission investigating the
dispatch of troops to Hong Kong.19 And finally,
he felt Canada must take the same risks as the
British and the Allied coalition.
The results of the Dieppe raid, combined
with the diminished threat of Allied defeat by
1943, changed the civil-military dynamic back in
favour of the politicians. This manifested itself
in the tighter control over commitments exerted
by the government. This did not translate into

a refusal to commit, but it did remove some
of the discretionary authority of the senior
commanders of the overseas forces. Indeed,
there was at the same time a growing concert
of voices that it was in the national interest to
commit the Canadian forces in some decisive
fashion, a policy which also ran counter to the
view of some in the military, most notably General
Andrew McNaughton, the senior Canadian army
officer in England. After Dieppe, Mackenzie King
wrote in his diary “somehow I cannot help feeling
that it would have been better had all our forces
been kept intact, until the moment when it was
absolutely advisable to attempt invasion.” He did
concede it might prove to “be for the best…in the
long run.” But, in the fall of 1942, he prevented
McNaughton from accompanying Churchill to the
Soviet Union where the latter planned to examine
a possible “northern” campaign; King was wary
lest McNaughton’s involvement be construed as a
commitment.20 By 1943, King made it clear that
he was prepared to defer to British views as to
how Canadian forces could be best employed, “as

CWM 20070029-005

Crerar (left) examines a map with Air Marshal Arthur Coningham, commander of 2nd Tactical Air Force, General B.L.M.
Montgomery, commander of 21st Army Group and Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander of the Allied
Expeditionary Air Forces, Normandy, August 1944.
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The senior ofﬁcers of First Canadian Army, photographed in May 1945. (l. to r. - seated) H.S. Maczek, Guy Simonds,
Harry Crerar, Charles Foulkes, Bert Hoffmeister; (standing) R.H. Keeﬂer, A.B. Matthews, H.W. Foster, R.W. Moncel,
S.B.Rawlins.

one great Army” or “divided up,” an indication of
his mistrust of his own generals.21 McNaughton
was opposed to such a division, but Crerar
continued to favour splitting the army, and
the government, while it remained equivocal,
asserted its control over any decision that might
lead to a commitment or the perception of a
commitment.
McNaughton continued to resist the breakup
of the Canadian army through mid-1943, a
position which diminished his status in the
eyes of the British and many Canadians. Crerar
felt that McNaughton was now “unable to stand
back and view the whole picture.” Indeed, Crerar
told High Commissioner Vincent Massey that he
disagreed with almost all of McNaughton’s ideas
about the army.22 Brooke noted McNaughton’s
almost “fanatic antagonism for employing any
portion of the Canadian Forces independent from
the whole.” Like Crerar, Brooke believed that the
employment of a Canadian division was becoming
an absolute necessity to “provide an outlet to post
officers and men to gain experience.”23 Crerar
pushed for a Canadian deployment to the Italian

theatre in 1943, against the wishes of his mentor
McNaughton. In the end, Crerar’s view prevailed,
but his success reflected, at least in part, the
government’s wariness of too much dependence
on advice from their own generals. In July 1943
1st Canadian Infantry Division, followed later
by 1st Canadian Corps, was dispatched to the
Mediterrenean. McNaughton was soon sent back
to Canada, and, after much discussion with the
British senior command, Crerar was selected to
replace him.
When Crerar officially became army
commander in March 1944, his aggressive
views on deployments were evidently a concern
for the Mackenzie King government. In April
1944, the government demanded a statement
from Crerar on the feasibility of the Normandy
operation, indicating that this would allow
them to issue instructions regarding Crerar’s
responsibilities to the government and First
Canadian Army’s position within 21st Army
Group. The government was basically asking for
a guarantee of the operation’s success. Crerar
feared he was being prepared as a sacrificial lamb
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in the event that the landing failed and balked
at providing such assurances.24 He eventually
delivered a qualified assessment. Field Marshal
Montgomery also tried to use Mackenzie King’s
doubts to limit Crerar’s right of recourse over
Montgomery’s head to the Canadian government,
and, somewhat astonishingly, almost succeeded
with Mackenzie King’s help. Crerar’s determined
rejoinders to Montgomery – “Though in practice
I expect to be treated, and behave, as any other
Army Commander, in principle I…am not. I
am the Canadian Army Commander and, as
such, am in a different category to the British
Army Commander” 25 – prompted concern
amongst Crerar’s colleagues that the British
might lose confidence in the Canadian military
leadership’s judgment if the military appeared
more “constitutionally minded than [their]
political masters.”26
To Crerar, and many of his colleagues,
the question was as much one of national
sovereignty as respect for their professional
perogatives. How could Canada clamour for
recognition of its autonomy, but not accept
the consequent responsibility and develop
mechanisms accordingly? Of course, Prime
Minister Mackenzie King recognized this equation,
but unlike his First World War counterpart, Sir
Robert Borden, consultation was enough for
King. He did not seek influence. His goal was to
avoid divisions at home. The Canadian senior
command drew different conclusions from the
experience of the First World War and was often
out in front of their political masters in seeking
strategic influence and recognition as the logical
consequence of Canada’s contributions to the war
effort.
These issues simmered for months,
reemerging as the reinforcement crisis in the
late summer and early fall of 1944 prompted
an outcry in Canada. They peaked with the
conscription crisis in the fall of 1944. Crerar,
though he would not comment publicly, believed
conscription was necessary and saw the issue
largely in terms of public education. Despite the
introduction of conscription, the influence of
the military was clearly on the wane. This was
evident as the end of the war loomed. By early,
1945 Crerar pressed for the army to be reunited,
and sought government promises on the shape
of postwar army as well as the occupation and

Pacific forces. His desire to maximize the effect
of the returning soldiers while retaining as much
expertise for the postwar army as possible also
shaped his approach to demobilization. Crerar
was confident that the civil-military dynamic
had changed, and he encouraged his son Peter
to stay in the permanent force: “I believe that
the Canadian Active Army of the future will be a
much finer organization than the old Permanent
Force of the past.”27
Still, as the war ended, Crerar feared that the
country might lapse into its traditional malaise
when it came to defence and the military. In his
view, national perspectives and policies remained
absent, a result of the expansion of the vote with
no concurrent expansion of civic education,
a narrow, self-interested outlook exacerbated
by the introduction of salaries for members
of Parliament.28 At war’s end, as he sought to
preserve the core of the army’s professionalism,
he believed that the necessary corollary was the
promotion of ideas on civics to the “average”
Canadian soldier whose lack of knowledge of
national and international affairs, and poor
physical condition had come as a shock to him.
Crerar introduced civic education courses such
as “The Organization and Operation of Different
Systems of National Government,” and “The
Place of Religion in Society.” Attendance was
voluntary, but characterized as “high.” As the
soldiers became restless waiting to be returned
to Canada, Crerar reminded his commanders
of the importance of providing the soldiers with
information “or guidance” on citizenship, religion,
rehabilitation and demobilization. To Crerar, the
veterans would provide the foundation for a more
mature postwar defence policy.29 Even after the
war, Crerar continued to promote his view that
military service was one of the best means of
producing national awareness.
After 1945, however, the appetite for views
like Crerar’s was limited. It seemed as if Canada
could avoid major conflicts, carving out a military
role as an honest broker in international relations
while remaining committed to the western
alliance, its military contribution significant but,
with the notable exception of Korea, untested in
war. The end of the Cold War, the terrorist attacks
of 9/11 and Canada’s mission in Afghanistan
have again raised important questions about
Canada’s defence policy, its security interests and
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the role its military in particular should play in
securing those interests. The past should provide
perspective on these issues, but only if properly
understood. For Canadians, the Second World
War remains the measure of what war is, and
should be: an unequivocal cause, an unambiguous
threat, clear goals, a population united to achieve
that goal, an all-out effort, definable steps
towards a victory and a precise ending. These
are comforting memories in complex times, but
false ones. The warm nostalgic glow that seems
to be enveloping that period combined with the
clarity that comes from knowing the outcome of
decisions and the distance from events masks
the difficult and complex issues decision-makers
faced during the war. Determining Canada’s
contribution to staving off Britain’s defeat and
then winning the war against the Axis was
anything but clear-cut. There was nothing predetermined about Canada’s Second World War
effort, however proudly we now look back on
that very substantial contribution. It does not
diminish that effort to examine the discussions
surrounding how Canada could best advance
and safeguard its interests. It is somewhat
anachronistic to discuss the war in terms of
interests as there was no real strategic culture
during that period nor was there a tradition of
trying to formally define Canada’s interests. But
that does not mean that Canada had no interests
or that no one had ideas on what they might
be. There was dissension if not public debate
surrounding the direction Canada’s war effort
should take, and if the resulting contributions
brought Canada benefits and influence, they
also came at a cost. And that too is a point that
should not be lost as we continue to debate how
best Canada and Canadians should engage with
the world.
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